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ABSTRACT. The tiger (Panthera tigris) is classi-
 ed as endangered and populations continue to
decline. This paper presents a formal economic
analysis of the two most imminent threats to the
survival of wild tigers: poaching tigers and hunt-
ing their prey. A model is developed to examine
interactions between tigers and farm households
living in and around tiger habitats. The analysis
extends the existing literature on tiger demogra-
phy, incorporating predator-prey interactions
and exploring the sensitivity of tiger populations
to key economic parameters. The analysis aims to
contribute to policy debates on how best to pro-
tect one of the world’s most endangered wild cats.
(JEL Q22)
I. INTRODUCTION
The earth’s remaining wild tiger (Pan-
thera tigris) populations continue to shrink
and fragment under ever increasing human-
related pressures. Over time, human activi-
ties have reduced tiger habitats by more than
90%. As a consequence, tigers now live in
only a small fraction of the potential habitat.
Recent estimates suggest that wild tigers in-
habit less than 5% of the 1.5 million km2 of
forest habitat available (Karanth 2001). At
present, more tigers exist in captivity than in
the wild (Nowell and Jackson 1996).
The evidence to date indicates that wild ti-
ger populations continue to decline despite
substantial conservation efforts by interna-
tional agencies, local conservation groups
and governments (Seidensticker, Christie,
and Jackson 1999). The IUCN identi es ti-
gers in all the range countries as endangered
and the signatories to CITES have placed a
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ban on all international trade in live tigers
and tiger parts.
Tigers need extensive areas to hunt and
breed, thus protecting wild populations and
sustaining their habitats present wildlife
managers with a set of complex and daunting
tasks. For instance, tigers are large-bodied,
obligate carnivores and readily come into
con ict with humans by killing livestock,
and occasionally people. Tiger numbers are
sensitive to the depletion of their prey caused
by local hunting (Karanth and Stith 1999).
The role tigers play as top predators is vital
to regulating and perpetuating ecological
processes and systems (Sunquist, Karanth,
and Sunquist 1999; Terborgh 1999). If either
predator or prey numbers decline, entire eco-
logical communities may become unstable
with more and more species being gradually
lost.
A further dif culty for conservation ef-
forts is that wild tigers occur only in Asia,
where the high incidence of rural poverty,
large numbers of livestock and high levels of
human population density and growth speed
forest degradation. Unlike much of Africa
and Latin America, the vast majority of for-
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ests in Asia have already been converted to
other land uses. In countries like India, forest
boundaries appear to have stabilized and the
major conservation management problem is
most often related to how communities use
forest resources within protected areas and
public forests (Wells1992; Ghimire 1994;
Nepal andWeber 1995; Studsrod andWegge
1995; Gunatilake 1998; Gunatilake and
Chakravorty 2000; Kumar et al. 2000; Lele
et al. 2000).
The proximate causes for the persistent
decline of wild tiger populations are many.
Pressures vary regionally and change over
time. The numerous forces threatening the ti-
ger’s survival include poaching, prey deple-
tion and habitat fragmentation due to land
clearing, livestock grazing, weed infesta-
tions, fuelwood and fodder extraction, smug-
gling for the illegal timber trade, and intru-
sive infrastructure (World Bank 1996;
Siedensticker, Christie, and Jackson 1999).
What the relative contributions of these
forces are to declining tiger populations and
how they interact are less well understood.
Tiger poaching, which is driven by the de-
mand for tiger products in the traditional Ori-
ental medicine trade, and prey depletion
caused by local hunting are considered to be
the most imminent threats to survival of the
species in the short run. In the early 1990s,
wildlife authorities observed a dramatic esca-
lation in the scale of poaching as tigers were
killed to satisfy the burgeoning demand for
tiger bones and organs for traditional Orien-
tal medicine (Meacham 1997).
The demographic consequences of de-
clining tiger populations through poaching
and prey depletion have been examined in
previous research (Kenney et al. 1995; Kar-
anth and Stith 1999). However, no formal
studies have examined the fundamental eco-
nomic causes driving wild tigers to extinc-
tion. This paper argues that a clearer under-
standing of how biological factors interact
with economic forces is crucial for guiding
policy choices aimed at sustaining viable
habitats and reversing the decline in wild ti-
ger populations. The work presented here
represents a  rst attempt to integrate eco-
nomic incentives into a predator-prey model
of tiger ecology.
The paper is organized as follows. Section
2 provides a brief description of the back-
ground to the problem. Section 3 outlines the
basic model, describing the behavior of sub-
sistence farmers and their interaction with ti-
gers and their prey. Section 4 presents a
stage-based demographic model of tiger pop-
ulation growth dynamics. Section 5 outlines
the simulation results of alternative scenar-
ios. Section 6 concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
The tiger once had a wide distribution
stretching across Asia from Bali, through In-
dia, to the Russian Far East, and West Asia.
Hunting and habitat erosion have extermi-
nated tigers through much of their previous
range. Most reserves are isolated from each
other and contain less than 30 animals (Sie-
densticker, Christie, and Jackson 1999). Ti-
gers feed predominately on large ungulates
(hoofed mammals such as deer, pigs, and
wild cattle). They cannot survive if a habitat
does not support suf cient densities of large
ungulates. To meet its basic nutritional
needs, an average tiger requires a minimum
of 3,000 kg of meat (or about 50 ungulates)
per annum to survive (Sunquist, Karanth, and
Sunquist 1999). A tigress raising three cubs
may need twice that amount. Like other big
cats, tigers can crop only 10% of the avail-
able prey biomass, suggesting that approxi-
mately 500 ungulates are required to support
one tiger in the wild (Karanth 2001).
Tigers require vast forest areas of reason-
able quality in which to roam, hunt, and
breed. Tiger densities vary across regions. In
relatively prey-rich forests, such as India’s
Kanha, Kaziranga, and Nagarahole National
Parks, densities can exceed 10–15 tigers per
100 km2 (Karanth andNichols 1998). In con-
trast, in areas where prey is less abundant and
more widely dispersed, like the Russian Far
East, tiger densities are considerably lower;
less than 1–2 tigers per 100 km2. The central
message emerging from the biological stud-
ies is that where prey is plentiful, tigers sur-
vive and may even endure limited poaching
pressures.
Conserving wild tiger populations re-
quires protecting the quality of their habitat
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as well as their prey base. The forests that
tigers and their prey inhabit provide a wide
range of economic, social, and environmen-
tal bene ts to people. These bene ts contrib-
ute greatly to human welfare, but they are
valued differently by different people and
different groups. Local, national, and interna-
tional interests in tigers and their habitats
also differ greatly across landscapes. To gov-
ernment policymakers, tiger habitats are of-
ten seen only for their ability to generate
income, employment, revenue, and foreign
exchange when converted to agriculture, tim-
ber, mines or other development-oriented ac-
tivities. To a small proportion of the humans
living in and around the forests, killing tigers
for their body parts yields a substantially
greater income than live tigers roaming free.
Many small-scale agricultural producers
view tigers and their prey as pests that dam-
age their livestock and crops.
Various studies document the crop dam-
age caused by large ungulates (Sekhar 1988;
World Bank 1996). Little quantitative infor-
mation is available about two of the most im-
minent threats to the survival of wild tigers:
the poaching of tigers and poaching of their
prey. Recent investigations suggest that the
trade in tiger parts is controlled by organized
criminal groups, involved in a host of other
illegal activities. In contrast, tiger poaching
is undertaken by locals who have an intimate
knowledge of the forests. The evidence sug-
gests that the illegal traders capture the bulk
of the pro ts, while poachers are paid low
prices for each tiger killed (Nowell 2000;
WPSI, 2001).1
National governments tend to in uence
control over the choice of forest bene ts.
When traditional rights and access shift in
ways that adversely impact local communi-
ties, households may have little incentive to
use natural resources, and in particular pro-
tect animals, in a sustainable way (Barbier
1992; Panayotou 1993; Gunatilake 1994,
1998; Tisdell 1995; Shyamsundar and
Kramer 1996). For this reason, providing
greater access and use of tiger habitats is of-
ten argued as the appropriate response to
meet conservation objectives (Saberwal
1996; Kothari, Suri, and Singh 1995).
India possesses the largest number of wild
tigers of any of the range states and has had
a relatively successful history of tiger protec-
tion (Nowell and Jackson 1996; Karanth
2001). Its response to declining tiger popula-
tions focuses on establishing special pro-
tected reserves and on law enforcement.2
Although the appropriateness of policy mea-
sures needed to halt or reverse declining tiger
populations is still contested, the overall
management approach has recently shifted
towards a participatory style known as Joint
Forest Management (JFM), at times driven
by external donor encouragement. The extent
to which JFM is adopted varies by state in
India. In most cases, households living in or
near forests utilize timber and non timber
forests resources for subsistence, cash and
wage incomes (d’Silva and Nagnath 2002).
Through sharing products, responsibilities,
and decision-making authority, JFM ap-
proaches seek to provide local communities
with incentives to protect the forest resources
that provide their income base and future
welfare.
Some argue that JFM should also be ex-
tended to reserves aimed at protecting wild-
life (Kothari, Suri, and Singh 1995). Other
studies raise important concerns about the
appropriateness of JFM-style conservation
and protection efforts (Gunatilake 1998;
Karanth and Stith 1999). For instance, Bar-
rett and Arcese (1995, 1998) question the as-
sumptions linking local communities and
sustainable forest resource use across diverse
geographic conditions and economic situa-
tions. Simpson (1995) suggests the need for
greater experimentation with direct-payment
for conservation efforts, rather than funding
untested participatory projects based on rais-
ing the value of forest products in ways that
may fail to deliver improved conservation
outcomes. This view  nds support in Gunati-
lake’s (1998) analysis of Sri Lanka which
provides evidence that policies aimed at re-
ducing dependency on forest based resources
1 For instance, Nowell’s (2000) study of the trade in
tiger parts suggests that the retail value of an adultmale
tiger varies from $15,000–$20,000, while the Wildlife
Protection Society of India reports cases where poach-
ers in the  eld are paid $15–$20.
2 The Indian Government introduced the Project Ti-
ger program in 1973.
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can be a much more effective way to protect
forests than policies aimed at using forest re-
sources. The issues concerning participatory
management addressed in these studies raise
important questions about the appropriate-
ness of the widespread promotion of JFM in
India for protecting tigers.
The model and simulations presented here
examine how the tiger’s biological needs in-
teract with economics incentives facing
households living in and around their habi-
tats. The analysis aims to contribute to the
policy debate about how best to protect tiger
populations.
III. THE MODEL
Most of India’s tiger habitats are in parks
and protected areas that also support various
forms of land uses, including agriculture,
livestock grazing and fuelwood collection
(Mishra 1997; Sekhar 1998). The intersper-
sion of humans in and around these parks
leads inevitably to con icts over resource use
(Schultz and Skonhoft 1996). Two motives
for local people hunting the tiger’s prey spe-
cies are considered. The  rst is when the
large ungulates cause damage to crops in ad-
joining agricultural areas, termed the ‘‘nui-
sance effect’’ by Marks (1984). The second
motive arises from the incentive of subsis-
tence producers to hunt ungulates as a sup-
plementary food source. On the other hand,
the incentive to hunt tigers is driven entirely
by the demand for tiger products.
The context for this model is a wild tiger
population in an insular forest patch sur-
roundedby agricultural land—a typical char-
acteristic of tiger reserves on the Indian sub-
continent. We extend the most recent model
of tiger population dynamics developed by
Karanth and Stith (1999), to include preda-
tor-prey interactions. The biological model is
incorporated into a household production
model in which subsistence farmers hunt ti-
gers and their prey.
The model presented here is similar to
Bluffstone’s (1995) analysis of fuelwood ex-
traction by subsistence farmers in Nepal. It is
more closely related to Barrett and Arcese’s
(1998) model of the hunting incentives for
farmers in an integrated conservation and de-
velopment project (ICDP) in Tanzania.3 This
paper extends this literature by incorporating
an economic model of poaching behavior
into a multiple species, predator-prey model.
The Household Model
As noted earlier, we consider a tiger re-
serve that is surrounded by agricultural land.
The production and consumption units are
households engaged in four kinds of activi-
ties: agricultural production, off-farm work,
hunting tigers and hunting herbivores (i.e.,
the tiger’s prey). Income from agricultural
production and off-farm work is used to pur-
chase food and other commodities. House-
holds hunt prey animals as a supplementary
source of food and to protect crops from
damage.4 The incentive to poach tigers is
driven entirely by the illegal trade in tiger
products that is controlled by criminal gangs
who determine the price paid to farmers for
each tiger killed.5 Since very little is known
about the nature of such poaching, we adopt
functional forms with parsimonious data re-
quirements. There are N households in the
area surrounding the tiger reserve. A Cobb-
Douglas function is employed to represent
household utility:
U 5 aF log(F ) 1 azlog(Z) 1 axlog(hx) [1a]
3 Barrett and Arcese’s (1998) work is of consider-
able relevance for wildlife conservation policies. The
authors develop a bio-economic simulation model that
shows that ICDP programs may be time inconsistent in
a stochastic environment.
4 In contrast to conditions in Africa, there appears to
be no substantial market for game meat on the Indian
subcontinentand limited demand for the hides of ungu-
lates. Thus we ignore the possibility that hunted prey
are sold in open markets.
5 Tigers that stray into agricultural lands and prey
upon domestic livestock are often killed by farmers.
While this issue is clearly important, we do not consider
such ‘‘nuisance’’ killing of tigers for two reasons. First,
such kills appear to be concentrated on animals that
stray outside reserves, while our attention is mainly fo-
cused upon the condition of animals with home ranges
within a reserve. However, the main reason we have
neglected this problem is that in the absence of suf -
cient data there appears to be no obvious manner in
which to parameterize the extent of nuisance killing in
the simulations presented in Section 5. This suggests
that our results may underestimate the true impacts of
tiger poaching.
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where: F represents consumption of food, Z
consumption of non-food items, hx consump-
tion of prey animals, ai . 0 (i 5 F, Z, x) are
the parameters of the utility function, with
aF 1 aZ1 ax5 1.
Equation [1a] is maximized subject to the
constraints:
wLo 1 pgG 1 (PT 2 qTWT)hT
5 pzZ1 pFF 1 qxWxhx, [1b]
G 5 kLbg(1 2 mX), [1c]
hx 5 dLxX, [1d]
hT 5 L
g
T1TR2
e
, [1e]
L5 Lo 1 Lg 1 Lx 1 LT, [1f]
where G is agricultural output, X is the bio-
mass of prey animals, Lg, is labor time de-
voted to agriculture, Lo is labor time devoted
to off-farm work, Lx is labor time spent hunt-
ing prey animals, LT is labor time on hunting
tigers and pg, pF, pz, PT are the prices of ag-
ricultural produce, food, non-food commodi-
ties and tigers respectively, qi(i5 T,X) is the
probability of being convicted for poaching
tigers (T) and their prey (X) and W i(i 5 T,
X) is the  ne per unit harvest if convicted for
poaching tigers or their prey. T is the number
of tigers and R the area of the reserve. k, x,
b, g, m, d . 0 are parameters.
By equation [1a] household utility de-
pends on the consumption of food (F ), other
goods, (a non-food composite commodity
[Z]) and the quantity of prey animals
consumed (hx).
Equation [1b] is the household budget
constraint. Food and other goods are pur-
chased at given prices pz and pF respectively.
These purchases are  nanced by: (i) the sale
of agricultural produce (G) which is sold at
a price pg; (ii) off farm labor (Lo) which is
remunerated at a wage rate of w; and (iii) ti-
ger poaching (hT). The farmers receive an
amount PT, for each tiger killed, which is de-
termined by traders. Since poaching is ille-
gal, it may result in conviction. The expected
penalty for poaching tigers is qT WT, where
qT is the probability of detection and convic-
tion, WT is the  ne per tiger killed. Thus the
expected payoffs from tiger poaching is de-
 ned by: pT 5 (PT 2 qTWT). Finally, since
poaching prey is also illegal, the household
may incur an expected penalty, qxWxhx;
where qx is the probability of detection and
conviction, Wx is the  ne per prey animal
poached (hx).
Equation [1c] describes the agricultural
production function. Following empirical
studies on subsistence farming in India, ag-
ricultural production (G) is assumed to de-
pend upon labor inputs (Lg), where b is the
elasticity and ka constant (Deninger andBis-
wanger 1998; Saha 1994).6 The production
function also takes into account the damage
to crops by the grazing and trampling of wild
tiger prey. This is given by (mX, where X is
the biomass of prey animals and m is the
damage coef cient.
Equation [1d] describes the prey harvest
production function. In the absence of data
on poaching of ungulate-prey in tiger habi-
tats, we adopt a functional form that has
been used in African studies of ungulate
hunting (Kinyua, van Kooten, and Bulte
2000). Thus, the harvest of herbivores (hx) is
a function of labor inputs (Lx) and the popu-
lation of ungulate prey (X), with unit elastici-
ties with respect to labor inputs and prey
populations.
Equation [1e] is the tiger poaching pro-
duction function. There is no data available
on the nature of tiger poaching. Hence, any
functional form that is adopted is necessarily
conjectural. Existing evidence suggests that
tigers are usually killed by poisoning, shoot-
ing, or setting traps and snares (WPSI 2001),
techniques requiring only minimal invest-
ment in capital equipment. To economize on
parameters, we abstract from the need for
capital equipment and assume that the har-
vest rate depends on the density of tigers and
6 The models used by Deninger and Biswanger
(1999) and by Saha (1994) focus on agricultural house-
holds. While it is unclear how appropriate their models
 t the type of agriculture practiced in and around tiger
habitats in India, the lack of better data limits our op-
tions.
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the amount of search effort.7 Tiger poaching
is thus speci ed using a Cobb-Douglas func-
tion with search effort and tiger densities as
the only arguments in the production func-
tion. The method by which the parameters on
search effort (LT) and tiger density (T/R) are
estimated is described in the Data Appendix.
Equation [1f ] is the time allocation con-
straint which requires that labor time devoted
to off-farm work (Lo), agriculture (Lg), and
hunting tigers and their prey (LT, Lx) must
equal the  xed endowment of time (L) avail-
able to the household. Leisure is not included
as a choice variable as existing household
survey data in potential tiger habitats in Ne-
pal suggest that opportunities for leisure con-
sumption are limited in such poor rural
households (Bluffstone 1995).8
The utility maximization problem is based
on the notion that households take the time
path of exogenous variables, such as the
stock of herbivores (X), as given. This re-
 ects the fact that there are assumed to be
many such households who have no property
rights in wild animals. Hence, they have little
incentive to take account of the future conse-
quences of their current actions. Formally,
this implies that households solve a static op-
timisation problem. Thus, for notational
brevity, time symbols are suppressed in the
above equations.9
Of particular interest in this context are
the solutions for poaching tigers and prey an-
imals. Solving the utility maximisation prob-
lem in equations [1a]–[1f ], yields the follow-
ing solution for the allocation of effort
expended on hunting tigers in each house-
hold:
LT 5 1gpTDew 2
1/(12g)
, [2a]
where pT5 (PT2 qTWT) is the net expected
payoff from poaching a tiger, D5 T/R is the
density of tigers.
Using [1e] the aggregate harvest of tigers
is given by:
HT ; NhT 5 N1gpTDew 2
g/12g
(D)e. [2b]
The returns to off-farm work are exoge-
nous and de ne the minimum payoffs to any
activity that the household will accept. Thus,
an increase in the wages paid for off-farm
work lowers poaching effort, while an in-
crease in the net expected payoffs from
poaching pT, or an increase in the density of
tigers D, increases poaching effort.
Labor time spent on hunting prey animals
is given by:
Lc 5
ax(w(L 2 Lg 2 LT) 1 pgG 1 pThT)
(w 1 qxWxdX)
,
[3a]
where
Lg 5 1 wbpgk(1 2 mX)2
1/(b21)
. [3b]
Substituting [3a] and [3b] in [1d] and aggre-
gating over the N households, gives the total
level of prey animals hunted:
Hx 5 NdLxX. [3c]
The implicit price of hunting prey is again
determined by the opportunity cost of time,
which is de ned by the off-farm wage rate.
The hunted prey animals are consumed
rather than sold, hence an increase in the
wage rate has con icting income and substi-
tution effects on prey hunting levels (i.e.,
7 Unlike many other species, tigers are highly secre-
tive animals inhabiting dense forests. Therefore the
main poaching constraint is likely to be the dif culty
involved in  nding a tiger. Field studies suggest that the
likelihood of an encounter depends on, inter alia the
density of tigers and the amount of search effort (Kar-
anth and Nichols 2000).These key features are captured
in equation [1e].
8 Note also that since the analysis focuses on subsis-
tence households with limited incomes, we ignore the
possibility that households may hire labor. In the ab-
sence of adequate data, we also ignore several other
components of agricultural household behavior includ-
ing: production and use of livestock (which may be
preyed upon by tigers); different types of farm output;
consumption of part of the farm output, and the use of
other non-labor inputs (e.g., fertilizers).
9 It is perhaps worth noting that suchmyopic behav-
iour has also been observed on communally held tribal
lands where users own property rights to forest re-
sources (Madhusudan and Karanth 1997)
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¶Hx/¶w . (,) 0). Speci cally, the income
effect of higher wages increases the demand
for prey animals as a consumption good,
while the substitution effect of higher off-
farm wages raises the opportunity costs of
time devoted to hunting prey. The net impact
of higher off-farm wages therefore depends
on the relative parameters of the model. In
contrast, an increase in the price of agricul-
tural goods, raises both income and the value
of crops damaged by prey. This leads to in-
creases in prey hunting levels (¶Hx/¶pg. 0).
Similarly, as expected, a reduction in the ex-
pected  ne (qxWx), or an increase in the crop
damage coef cient (m), both lead to higher
levels of prey poaching (i.e., ¶Hx/¶(qxWx) ,
0, ¶Hx/¶m . 0).
This simple model of household behavior
ignores a number of signi cant issues that
are of relevance in the context of wild animal
poaching in India.10 For example, anecdotal
evidence suggests that corruption amongst
forest of cials may be widespread in some
tiger reserves in India (Breeden and Wright
1996). This is perhaps a consequence of the
relatively low wages that are paid to forest
of cials—often in arrears. In the absence of
data on the incidence of corruption, we do
not explicitly deal with the modeling com-
plications that arise when corruption is
pervasive. However, it can be shown that
the expected penalty for poaching in equa-
tion [1b] is formally equivalent to the re-
duced form payoff function that arises
when poachers bribe corrupt of cials.11 The
model also assumes that the probability of
conviction is  xed. In practice, the proba-
bility of a successful prosecution is likely
to depend on the level of expenditure by
poachers on their legal defense and the atti-
tudes of local magistrates to wildlife pro-
tection. Moreover, conviction rates and
the formal penalties for poaching may not
capture all the costs associated with being
detected if caught poaching, suggesting con-
siderable uncertainty in the payoffs to
poaching.
IV. TIGER BIOLOGY
The use of a single equation tomodel pop-
ulation dynamics is often considered inap-
propriate for large predators that exhibit
complex patterns of behaviour and face dif-
ferent mortality rates over various stages in
their life cycle (see Burgman, Ferson, and
Akcakaya 1993). Accordingly, the existing
literature describes tiger population dy-
namics using stage based stochastic demo-
graphic models. In this paper, we follow this
convention and extend the most recentmodel
of tiger demography by Karanth and Stith
(1999) to incorporate predator-prey interac-
tions.
The Karanth-Stith model identi es tigers
of both sexes, in four distinct demographic
stages: cubs (younger than one year), juve-
niles (one to two years), transients (tigers
older than two years in search of a home
range), and adults (breeding tigers with a
home range). In the absence of human pres-
sures, mortality rates at each stage of the life
cycle depend on intrinsic survival rates,
which incorporate deaths from natural fac-
tors such as disease and intraspeci c compe-
tition. For expositional ease, we begin by
describing the dynamics of tiger populations
when prey are plentiful and there is no
poaching.
The number of cubs that survive in any
year is determined by the birth rate of breed-
ing females and the survival rate of cubs:
Tct11 5 s cbTaft , [4a]
where subscripts denote time periods: Tct11 is
the number of surviving cubs in period t 1
1; s c is the survival rate of cubs; b is the birth
10 We are grateful to a referee for suggesting these
issues.
11 To see this suppose for simplicity that a fraction
h of forest of cials are corruptible, perhaps because of
the low wages they receive. The Indian forest service
is a hierarchical organisation and the anecdotal accounts
of corruption allege that bribery is most pervasive
amongst the lowestpaid of cials. Letw be the probabil-
ity that a poacher encounters a forest of cial. Then cet-
eris paribus, the probability of being prosecuted is
given by w(1 2 h). Furthermore if l is the probability
of a successful conviction, then q j 5 l jw j(1 2 h) ( j
5 T, X) is the total probability of being convicted for
poaching. Damania (2002) assesses the complications
that arise in determining optimal environmental regula-
tions under corruption.We do not explore these impor-
tant and complex issues in this paper.
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rate per breeding adult female; and Taft is the
number of breeding adult females. Following
Karanth and Stith (1999), we assume an
equal sex ratio at birth andmean litter size of
three. The birth rate, b, is treated as a Poisson
variable with a mean of three. Randomness
is included in the model to capture demo-
graphic stochasticity.12
The surviving cubs move to the juvenile
stage in the following period. The number of
juveniles who survive is
T jst11 5 s jsT cst (s 5 m, f ), [4b]
where T jst11 is the number of surviving juve-
nile males (m) and females ( f ) in period t1
1, s js(s 5 m, f ) is the intrinsic survival rate
of juvenile males (m) and females ( f ).
At two years, the surviving juveniles be-
come transients. Transients are de ned as
adult tigers in search of home territories in
which to hunt and breed. If a vacant home
range is available, a transient immediately
occupies the territory and is classi ed as a
breeding adult. Let Ks (s 5 m, f ) denote the
maximum number of territories available for
adults of gender s5 m, f. LetTast be the num-
ber of surviving adults of gender s 5 m, f
with existing home ranges. Then the number
of vacant territories available for the tran-
sients to occupy is given by:
V st11 5 Max(0, Ks 2 Tast )(s 5 m, f ). [4c]
The number of transients in period (t1 1) is
de ned by: (i) the number of transients who
survive from the previous period, (ii) juve-
niles who progress to the transient stage, (iii)
minus the transients who  nd home ranges
and thus exit to the breeding adult stage:
Ttst115 sts(s jsT jst 1 Ttst )2 Vst11(s5m, f ), [4d]
where Tt st11 is the number of surviving tran-
sients in period t1 1, st s is the survival rate
of transients of gender s 5 m, f.
Finally, the number of breeding adults is
given by the existing number of surviving
adults and the new recruits to the category of
breeding adult:
T ast11 5 (s asTast 1 Vst11), [4e]
where s as is the survival rate of adults of gen-
der s 5 m, f. The total population of non-cub
tigers (T) is de ned to include the sum of ju-
veniles, transients and adults, of both sexes.
The model thus far assumes that prey are
plentiful. The only constraints on population
growth considered so far are the intrinsic sur-
vival rates and the amount of territory avail-
able to establish home ranges (i.e., Ks). If
prey depletion lowers hunting success rates,
it will lead to greater mortality of tigers. We
therefore extend the model to take account of
the impact of prey availability on tiger popu-
lation growth.
Data on the intrinsic growth rates of indi-
vidual prey species and the effects of browse
and forage competition between species in ti-
ger habitats is unavailable. Hence we adopt
a simple approach and model the combined
biomass of all prey species using a logistic
equation of the form:
Xt11 2 Xt 5 Xtr(1 2 Xt/X¯) 2 Hxt 2 Yt, [5]
where Xt is the prey biomass at time t, r is the
intrinsic growth rate, X¯ is the prey carrying
capacity of the forest, Hxt is the human har-
vest of the prey biomass de ned in equation
[3c] and Yt is the harvest of the prey by ti-
gers which is described below.
Field studies suggest that on average a ti-
ger requires approximately 3,000 kg of prey
per year to survive (Sunquist, Karanth, and
Sunquist 1999). We therefore de ne the min-
imum food intake of a tiger as M 5 3,000
kg. Field observations also reveal that tigers
succeed in capturing between 10%–20% of
the available prey biomass in their home
ranges (Schaller 1967; Sunquist 1981; John-
singh 1983). In the presence of competing
predators such as wild dogs (Cuon alpinus)
and leopards (Panthera pardus), a predation
rate of 10% is deemed more appropriate
(Karanth 2001). Thus, the predation rate is
de ned as r5 0.10. It follows that the maxi-
mum number of tigers that can be sustained
with a prey base of Xt is: rXt/M. Accord-
12 The random numbers were generated in Excel us-
ing a random seed of 1 and mean of 3.
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ingly, the prey biomass consumed by tigers
is given by:
Yt 5 MTt if rXt . MTt
Yt 5 rXt otherwise, [6a]
where Tt is the total number of tigers in pe-
riod t, M is the minimum food intake and r
is the predation rate.
Thus, when prey are plentiful (i.e., rXt .
MTt), each tiger is able to meet its nutritional
needs and successfully capturesMkg of prey
per annum, hence Yt 5 MTt. On the other
hand, if there is insuf cient prey to meet the
needs of the total population, the level of pre-
dation is at its maximum level Yt 5 rXt.
A shortage of prey could have two effects
on tiger survival prospects. First, prey deple-
tion is likely to depress survival rates across
all demographic stages. Second, a shortage
of prey may also lower the carrying capacity
of the habitat and thus lead to an expansion
in the home ranges of breeding adult females.
In the absence of data on the effects of prey
depletion across demographic groups, we
follow Karanth and Stith and assume that
prey depletion effects only: (i) the carrying
capacity of the habitat; and (ii) the survival
rates of cubs. Thus, under conditions of prey
depletion the survival rates of cubs and the
carrying capacity are depressed by a prey
depletion factor that is de ned as:
h t11 5 5
1 if rXt 2 MTt $ 0
rXi
MTt
if rXt 2 MTt , 0
. [6b]
The cub survival rate (s c) and the carrying
capacity (Ks) are pre-multiplied by [6b].
It is acknowledged that the neglect of prey
depletion effects on the survival rates across
other demographic categories is unsatisfac-
tory. This approach can therefore be ex-
pected to underestimate the true impact of
prey depletion if survival rates are depressed
more generally across all demographic
stages. However, re nements of the model
must await further research on this issue.
Turning next to the effects of poaching.
Poachers target juveniles, transients, and
adults. The number of tigers killed at each
stage is assumed to be proportional to the ex-
isting distribution of tigers across the various
demographic stages. Let superscript i(i 5 j,
t, a) denote demographic stages and recall
that superscript s 5 M, F denotes gender.
De ne k ist as the proportion of male or female
tigers at demographic stage i(i5 j, t, a). Then
thenumberofgenders tigers poachedatdemo-
graphic stage i(i 5 j, t, a) is de ned as:
HisTt11 5 HTtk ist , [6c]
where HTt is the total harvest of tigers as de-
termined in equation [2b], k ist 5 (T ist /Tt) is
the proportion of gender s tigers at stage
i(i 5 j, t, a), T ist 5 number of gender s ti-
gers at stage i and Tt is the total population
of tigers. The number of tigers at each stage
is thus lowered by the amount de ned in
equation [6c].
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
We now combine the economic models of
behavior (equations [2b] and [3c]) and tiger
population growth (equations [4a]–[6c]) to
determine the time paths of ‘tiger stocks’ un-
der alternative scenarios. For given parame-
ters, the level of poaching emerges from the
optimising decisions of farmers and poach-
ers. This in turn affects tiger stock levels.
Model parameters are varied to determine
the sensitivity of tiger population levels to
changes in economic circumstances.
In the model labor is allocated across dif-
ferent activities until the marginal returns are
equalised. The returns to off-farm work are
exogenously  xed and hence de ne the mini-
mum payoffs to any activity that a household
will accept. The returns to agriculture vary
with the price of agricultural commodities
and the losses due to wildlife predation. The
payoffs to poaching also vary with wildlife
stocks and the expected penalties for convic-
tion. It follows that changes in the returns to
any one activity may induce a reallocation of
labor across other activities and therefore
could alter the level of poaching.
The parameters for the basic tiger popula-
tion model (equations [4a]–[4e]) are from
Karanth and Stith (1999), and are based on
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 eld research in India and Nepal. Behavioral
data for subsistence farmers are drawn from
a variety of sources.13 The Data Appendix
provides details of the sources of informa-
tion, assumptions, estimation methods and
parameter values.
The benchmark simulation draws on pa-
rameter estimates based on the best available
data for those regions with reasonably
healthy tiger populations (e.g., the Kanha and
Bandipur Tiger Reserves in India). The habi-
tat is assumed to comprise an area of approx-
imately 1,000 km2 with a prey carrying ca-
pacity of 4,500 kg/km2.14 It is supposed that
when prey are plentiful (rXt.MTt), the un-
disturbed habitat can sustain Kf 5 24 breed-
ing adult females and Km5 12 adult males
(Karanth and Stith 1999; Kenney et al.
1995). In the base case, farmers receive Rs
1,000 for each tiger killed, face a  ne of Rs
25,000 and a 2% probability of conviction
(WPSI 2001).15 The off-farm wage rate is set
at Rs 40 per day and the price of agricultural
produce at Rs 8.5/kg. We begin by assuming
a human population density of N 5 400
households.
It is important to distinguish between the
ecological effects and economic causes of
prey depletion, from those of tiger poaching.
In order to gain some understanding of these
linkages, we begin by presenting simulations
for the stylized case when only tiger poach-
ing occurs. We then assume that there is no
tiger poaching and consider the impact of
prey poaching on tiger populations. Finally
simulations are presented for the complete
model where both tigers and their prey are
hunted by subsistence farmers.
Consider  rst the effects of tiger poaching
in isolation.16 Curve A in Figure 1 shows the
tiger population trajectory in a pristine habi-
tat with no tiger poaching or prey depletion.
The population achieves a stable equilibrium
at 87 adult and juvenile tigers, suggesting a
density of 9 tigers/100 km2. This outcome
approximates population levels in the frag-
mented, yet relatively healthy habitats found
in India and Nepal. Curve B simulates the ef-
fects of tiger poaching when the parameters
are at the base case levels.17The tiger popula-
tion declines to a stable 53 adult and juvenile
tigers, with poachers harvesting 6 tigers per
year (approximately 11 percent of the popu-
lation). Curve C simulates the effects of a
50% increase in the price per tiger killed (Rs
1,500). The population falls substantially to
27 tigers, with 4 tigers harvested each year
(approximately 12% of the population).
The simulation presented inCurve Dillus-
trates the effects of an 80% increase in the
price paid to tiger poachers. When the price
is increased to Rs 1,800, the population de-
clines to 19 tigers with 3 harvested each year.
In curve E, when the poaching price is in-
creased from Rs 1,800 to Rs 1,900, the tiger
population collapses within 50 years.
This  nding suggests that a relatively
small increase in the payoffs to poaching
(fromRs 1,800 toRs 1,900) can drive a small
population to extinction in a relatively short
time period. This is a signi cant result,
which is consistent with Karanth and Stith’s
(1999) simulations and related evidence that
hunting of large felids can lead to sudden ex-
tinction when it exceeds a certain threshold
level (Martin and de Meulanaer 1988; Bailey
1993). The impact of poaching may thus be
discontinuous and prone to induce collapses
in populations. This appears to be an exam-
ple of the unstable equilibria frequently en-
countered in discrete time predator-prey
13 Many of the tiger reserves are in tribal areas. It
seems likely that behavior of tribal agriculturalists
would differ from those of other non-tribal agricultural-
ists. We have been compelled to use the only available
data on agriculture, which is based on non-tribal agri-
culture. There is clearly an urgent need for  eldwork
in and around tiger reserves to obtain more accurate
information.
14 The estimates of prey biomass in prime areas with
tiger densities of between 10–12 per 100 km2 is derived
from data in Karanth and Nichols (2000). It is useful to
note that this estimate is also consistent with earlier
studies conducted using less advanced techniques. For
instance, Johnsingh (1983) estimates a prey density of
3,382 kg/km2 in Bandipur reserve and a predation rate
of 30%, suggesting a possible carrying capacity of
3,382 (1 1 30%) 5 4,397 kg/km2.
15 The assumption of a 2% conviction rate is a clear
overestimate of the true conviction probabilities, our
base case results thus underestimate the most likely
consequence of poaching (WPSI 2001).
16 Formally this can be achieved by setting all the
coef cient of prey poaching to zero.
17 In the base case farmers receive Rs 1,000 for each
tiger killed, face a  ne of Rs 25,000 and a 2% probabil-
ity of conviction. N is  xed at 400 households.
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FIGURE 1
The Impact of P oaching P rice on Tiger P opulations
models, when the predator population is at
low levels (May 1978, Freedman 1979). This
 nding has important policy implications
since a large number of reserves have low ti-
ger numbers of less than 30 animals per
1,000km2. The simulations highlight the po-
tential risks of extinction facing small tiger
populations subjected to increased poaching
pressure.
Figure 2 summarizes the consequences of
prey depletion when there is no tiger poach-
ing. Curve A shows the wild tiger population
trajectories when the parameters are held at
base levels in the model (ie, a farm popula-
tion of 400 households; an off-farm wage of
Rs 40 per day; and an agricultural output
price of Rs 8.5/kg). In the base case, there is
a stable population of 86 tigers that approxi-
mates that of a pristine habitat. When the
number of farm households is increased by
50% (from 400 to 600) and off-farm wage
and agricultural production prices are held
constant at base levels, tigers are extinct in
less than 60 years (Curve B). Higher human
populations increase the demand for ungu-
lates as a supplementary food source which
leads to a shrinking prey base and hence a
decline in the tiger population.
The model simulations further highlight
the sensitivity of tiger populations to agricul-
tural income. Even when the number of farm
households is reduced to 500, if agricultural
prices are increased by 20% (to Rs 10.2/kg),
tiger populations are eliminated in less than
80 years (Curve C). On the other hand, Curve
D shows that a 20% decline in agricultural
prices leads to recovery of the population.
This result helps illustrate how direct and in-
direct agricultural subsidies impact the envi-
ronment and ecosystems. The responsiveness
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FIGURE 2
The Impact of P rey P oaching on Tiger P opulation
of prey depletion to agricultural prices sug-
gests that the withdrawal of agricultural sub-
sidies may generate substantial improve-
ments in habitat quality.
We also consider the effects of a 100% in-
crease in off-farm wage when the number of
households is set at N5 500, with all other
parameters held at the base level. This simu-
lation slowed the extinction time, suggesting
that the substitution effects of higher off-
farm wages do not reduce hunting levels suf-
 ciently to outweigh the effects of a higher
human population. This is clearly a conse-
quence of the assumed parameter values in
the simulations and highlights the need for
more reliable parameter estimates based on
 eld studies in tiger reserves. Finally, a
100% increase in either the  ne for hunting
or the probability of conviction both lead to
recovery of the population (i.e., the popula-
tion reaches the same levels as Curve D).
Figure 3 simulates the combinedeffects of
both tiger poaching and prey poaching by
subsistence farm households. In Figure 3,
Curve A portrays the tiger population trajec-
tory when all parameters are at their base lev-
els. The population stabilizes at 53 tigers,
with 6 tigers harvested each year. A common
scenario faced by India’s tiger reserves is in-
creasing human population pressure. Curve
B in Figure 3 simulates the impact on tiger
populations when agricultural prices, tiger
poaching prices and the number of farm
households all increase by 50%. The result is
that the reserve’s tiger population is extinct
in less than 45 years.
In Figure 3, Curve C, the  nes for both
prey poaching and tiger poaching are dou-
bled to represent a reserve under pressure
from humanpopulation. The tiger population
stabilizes at 37 animals. The higher  nes
lower the payoffs from poaching both tigers
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FIGURE 3
The Impact of Tiger P oaching and P rey P oaching on Tiger P opulations
and their prey, so that effort devoted to hunt-
ing falls. On the other hand, if only the  ne
for tiger poaching is doubled, while the  ne
for prey poaching is held constant, the tiger
population declines to zero in 54 years.18
The  nal simulation in Figure 3 (Curve D)
doubles off-farm wages and the  nes for ti-
ger poaching and prey poaching. The result
is a tiger population stabilizing at 53, with 5
killed each year. The increase in off-farm
wages raises the opportunity costs of time al-
located to poaching, while the higher ex-
pected  nes lower the payoffs from hunting
both tigers and their prey.
Figure 4 illustrates how households allo-
cate labor to tiger poaching in each of the
four scenarios presented in Figure 3. For ex-
ample, Curve A in Figure 4 presents the same
base case as Curve A in Figure 3 to demon-
strate how the percentage of total household
labor allocated to tiger poaching changes
over time. Tiger poaching effort begins ini-
tially at just less than 25% of household labor
allocation, declining gradually and stabiliz-
ing at around 7% with 6 tigers poached each
year and the tiger population stable at 53.
For Curve B, agricultural prices, tiger
poaching prices and total farm household
numbers all increase by 50%. The initial tiger
poaching effort is slightly more than 25% of
household labor allocation; a higher initial al-
location than the base case, re ecting the in-
creased price for tigers. Simultaneously, in-
creased agricultural prices, together with a
higher farm population, leads to greater prey
poaching and a reduction in the prey bio-
mass, thereby lowering tiger survival rates.
18 This simulation, which has a population trajectory
similar to Curve B, is not shown to avoid clutter.
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FIGURE 4
Household Tiger P oaching Effort
As tiger densities decline, the likelihood of
 nding a tiger decreases, so that the relative
payoffs to labor allocated to hunting tigers
falls. Hence the time allocated to hunting ti-
gers declines to zero as the population
reaches extinction in around 40 years.
Curve C uses the same parameter settings
as Curve B except for the tiger poaching and
prey poaching  nes are doubled. The result
is less household time devoted to hunting ti-
gers as the expected cost of hunting increases
due to the higher penalties. When off-farm
wages and  nes are doubled (Figure 4, Curve
D), labor time devoted to tiger poaching de-
clines and the tiger population stabilizes at
more than 60. The increased  nes together
with a higher off-farm wage lower the rela-
tive payoffs from poaching and thus leads to
lower levels of poaching.
We considered numerous other scenarios
for the case of a reserve under increased
pressure from human population and activi-
ties. The overall conclusion from a large
number of simulations is that tiger popula-
tions in habitats with a healthy prey base are
able to withstand modest levels of poaching.
When the prey base is depleted, tiger survival
prospects decline. Hence, recovery of the
population necessitates controls over both
the level of tiger and prey poaching.
These results indicate that anti-poaching
policies should be directed at increasing the
opportunity costs of poaching activities. In
practical terms, this might involve higher
 nes, or more frequent and intensive patrols
and other related policies that require greater
avoidance by poachers, thus rendering
poaching more dif cult. These initiatives
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would increase the opportunity costs of
poaching. The provision of alternative
sources of employment would also increase
the opportunity costs of poaching, so long as
it does not induce further migration into the
area. The simulations suggest that higher off-
farm wages when used in conjunction with
other protective measures, would induce a
rapid recovery of the tiger population (eg
compare Curve C with D in Figure 3).
This outcome is suggestive of the reasons
why tigers thrive in some prey abundant re-
gions and not in others. In areas where the
opportunity cost of poaching is high, due to
effective patrols, for instance (e.g., the
Kanha, Kaziranga, Nagarahole Tiger Re-
serves), tigers have survived in reasonable
numbers. In more accessible and less pro-
tected landscapes, no tigers are found despite
the existence of suitable habitats (Wikrama-
nayake et al. 1998; Karanth 2001).
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper extends the existing biological
literature on tiger populations by linking a
stochastic demographic model of tiger popu-
lation with household behavior that endogen-
izes two key threats to tiger populations:
poaching tigers and poaching their prey. Al-
ternative scenarios simulate the impact of the
number of households, agricultural income,
wage income, and poaching intensity of ti-
gers and their prey. The results highlight the
sensitivity, fragility, and instability of tiger
populations to key economic parameters.
Most notable is the  nding that the level of
human population is the most potent threat to
the tiger’s prey base and that the effects of
large human populations may be dif cult to
reverse with the economic instruments con-
sidered in this paper.
The sensitivity of tiger populations to
poaching incentives in prey depleted reserves
is another important concern. Tiger popula-
tions appear to exhibit threshold responses to
increases in poaching intensity. In particular,
when prey levels are depleted, a relatively
small increase in tiger poaching may trigger
extinction. Thus, the control of poaching in
prey-depleted environments remains a matter
of critical concern. This suggests the need for
increasing the conviction rates for poaching.
In practice, this may be dif cult to achieve,
for it requires major institutional and judicial
reform accompanied by substantial invest-
ments in law enforcement.
The modelling results suggest that an al-
ternative and potentially more effective way
to reduce poaching is to increase the opportu-
nity cost of poaching. Policies such as the
provision of alternative employment and off-
farm income, accompanied by controls on
forest access, would have the desired effect
of reducing the incidence of poaching.
The modelling results also raise questions
about conservation efforts and forest man-
agement strategies that emphasize any type
of forest resource use in and around tiger
habitats, including JFM. The net social costs
and bene ts of alternative rural development
strategies need to be examined. Examples in-
clude increasing non-farm and non-forestry
employment, improving access to education,
enhancing agricultural productivity, promot-
ing non-forest dependent commercial activi-
ties and shifting private and public infrastruc-
ture investments away from tiger habitats.
These are a formidable, yet urgently needed
set of tasks, given that about two-thirds of In-
dia’s total forest cover is in districts where
the incidence of poverty (mostly among the
tribal people) is more than 50 percent (Ku-
mar et al. 2000).
A number of alternative measures have
been suggested to tackle the problem of tiger
poaching. These include strategies to reduce
the demand for tiger products in traditional
Oriental medicine and policies to control the
illegal cross-border trade in tiger products
which is controlled by criminal organizations
(Nowell 2000). Captive breeding of tigers for
the Oriental medicine trade in bones and or-
gans is yet another suggestion which has
gained some popularity. Support for this pol-
icy is based on the notion that generating
supplies from captive–bred animals, com-
modity prices are expected to fall, thereby
lowering the incentive to poach species in the
wild. Damania and Bulte (2001) assess the
prospects of captive breeding in considerable
detail. The analysis reveals that when the
illegal trade in wildlife commodities is
controlled by cartelized oligopolies, captive
breeding may lead to further poaching of
wild stocks, as has occurred with the moon
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bears of China and Vietnam and the croco-
diles in Thailand (Meacham 1997). More im-
portant, however, these initiatives would do
little to prevent extinction of tigers through
depletion of their prey base.
The results in this paper are tentative.
Lack of data and information on key eco-
nomic and biological factors means that the
model’s parameters are based on imprecise
estimates. To guard against exaggerating the
threat of extinction we have adopted conser-
vative assumptions. For instance, the proba-
bility of convicting poachers is assumed to
be considerably higher than the available
data suggests. Similarly, we use the upper
bound of estimates for ungulate intrinsic
growth rate and the lower bound of estimates
for the returns to agriculture. Moreover,
while prey depletion can be expected to ef-
DATA APPENDIX
Data Sources and P arameter Values
Parameter Description Value Source
s af Survival rate of adult female .9 Karanth and Stith (1999)
s am Survival rate of adult male .8 Karanth and Stith (1999)
stf Survival rate of transient female .7 Karanth and Stith (1999)
stf Survival rate of transient male .65 Karanth and Stith (1999)
s j Survival rate of juveniles .9 Karanth and Stith (1999)
s c Survival rate of cubs .6 Karanth and Stith (1999)
r Predation rate .10 Karanth (1988)
M Minimum prey biomass for tiger survival 3,000 Kg Karanth (1988)
ax Coef cient for game meat demand in utility .05 World Bank/Nepal Nutrition
function. Based on proportion of meat in and Energy Survey
diet.
L Total endowment of labor per household 500 days per Bluffstone (1995)
annum
b Coef cient in agricultural output production .154 Saha (1994)
function
m Damage to crops per unit prey biomass; calcu- .00001 per Sekhar (1998) tables 1–4
lated as percent crop loss per hectare/prey 1,000 Kg
biomass. This data is based on survey work prey biomass
at Sariska Tiger Reserve.
X¯ Prey carrying capacity 4,500 kg/km2 See text footnote 5
r Prey intrinsic growth rate .4 See text
d Coef cient of prey hunting production function .002 Lower estimate from Kinyua
et al. (2000)
qx Probability of prey hunter being convicted .001 See notes below
W¢x, WT Penalty for poaching prey and tigers Rs5,000, Wildlife Protection Act,
Rs25,000 India, 1972, Section 51
w Daily wage rate for off-farm work Rs40 Reserve Bank of India (1999)
pg Price of agricultural produce Rs850/100 kg Dinar et al. (1998)
PT Price paid to poachers for each tiger Rs1,000 WPSI (2001)
qT Probability of being convicted for poaching a .02 WPSI (2001)
tiger
l, x Parameters of tiger poaching production .46, 1.04 See notes below
function
fect survival prospects across all age classes,
the model conservatively assumes that it has
no impact on juvenile or transient tigers, but
only depresses cub survival rates and the
adult carrying capacity.
Finally, it is important to note that this pa-
per ignores a number of other important
threats to the tiger. Key amongst these is the
unrelenting erosion of habitats and forest
corridors connecting tiger reserves. Many ti-
ger reserves are threatened with plans for
major development projects including mines,
roads and dams (World Bank 1996). The re-
serves face further pressures from the steady
extraction of resources for timber, fuelwood,
fodder, and livestock grazing, all of which
are factors linked closely to human popula-
tion growth. The effects of habitat erosion re-
main an area in need of urgent research.
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Data Appendix Notes
1. Coef cients for the poaching production func-
tions.
There are no studies on, nor data available on
tiger poaching. We therefore seek to infer poach-
ing production parameters using indirect proxies.
One of the more sophisticatedmethods used to es-
timate tiger densities relies on a technique known
as ‘‘camera trap sampling.’ ’ Cameras are posi-
tioned to sample an area within which some of
the passing animals are photographed. The popu-
lation estimates are based on the number of tigers
photographed and the associated capture proba-
bilities derived from the data (Karanth and Nich-
ols, 1998, 2000). Many of the poaching tech-
niques are ‘‘passive’ ’ and involve laying a snare
or trap in areas where tigers are thought to reside.
In the absence of any other information, we as-
sume that that the main constraint on poaching is
the dif culty involved in  nding a tiger. It is sup-
posed that the probability of a tiger being caught
in a snare or trap is analogous to that of capturing
a tiger with a camera in the area being sampled.
Thus the probability of poaching is assumed to
depend on the density of tigers and the number of
days that a trap has been laid. We use information
from the camera capture studies to proxy the
poaching technology parameters. Using data from
the most recent study (Karanth and Nichols
2000), we regress the number of tigers captured
by cameras against trapping effort and tiger den-
sity to obtain the coef cients of the poaching pro-
duction function:
Log(HT) 5 .46 Log(Effort)
(24.09)
1 1.04 Log(Density)
(4.41)
(R2 5 .80, F 5 21.244, SE of regression 5 33,
number of observations 5 7, t-statistics in paren-
theses below the coef cients)
The estimates are based on data from the
Pench, Kanha, Kaziranga, Nagarahole, Bhadra,
Bandipur, and Ranthambore Tiger Reserves.
The parameters for poaching effort and density
effects are based on these regression estimates. It
is acknowledged that these estimates are at best
only broadly indicative and likely to be biased.
Moreover, it is dif cult to determine the direction
of the bias. If bait is more (less) ef cient at cap-
turing tigers than cameras, we will have underes-
timated (overestimated) the coef cient on effort
and also biased the estimate of density. This is,
however, the best available information.
The parameters used for the probability of de-
tecting and convicting poachers are arbitrary. The
Wildlife Trust of India (www. Wildlifetrust-
o ndia.org) has recorded only two convictions for
tiger poaching which suggests that the rate of con-
viction for poaching tigers may be lower than .02
(WPSI 2001). It is likely that the parameters used
in this paper substantially overestimate the true
probability of conviction. There is no published
data on the conviction rates for poaching prey ani-
mals, though it is deemed to be lower than that
for tiger poaching (Wildlife Trust of India, pers.
comm.). A higher conviction rate is used than is
suggested by the anecdotal evidence since actual
convictions rates may not account for all the costs
associated with detection and prosecution.
2. Off farm wages
Average rural wages in India vary from Rs 40
per day in some states (e.g., Haryana which has
no tiger reserve) to Rs 22 in other states (e.g., As-
sam and Madhya Pradesh with tiger populations
[Reserve Bank of India 1999]). We adopt the up-
per bound of these  gures and set the off-farm
wage rate at Rs 40, which is higher than the aver-
age wage in most tiger range states in India.
Moreover, as noted by a referee, if rural wages
 uctuate seasonally then poaching is likely to be
concentrated in seasons of low labor demand and
low wages. In this case, we are likely to have fur-
ther overestimated the true off-farm wage in the
off-peak seasons.
3. The Prey Intrinsic growth rate
Field data obtained by Karanth at Nagarahole
suggests the following intrinsic growth rates for
the major prey species: chital (Axis axis), 32%;
gaur (Bos gaurus ), 43%; wild pig (Sus scrofa),
150%. The aggregate prey growth rate weighted
by estimated prey densities (see Karanth and
Nichols 2000) yields an intrinsic growth rate of
at least r 5 0.4.
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